Extends: AGTS_CLEARINGHOUSE_SPEC.md §11, §14 · Implements: RTR Regulated Collapse Architecture Stages 6–7
§1 Overview
The base AGTS protocol produces a single canonical leaf per governance decision: the authorization record. This extension closes the accountability loop by adding two additional leaf types, creating a Triple-Leaf Ledger per governed action:
| Leaf | Artifact type | What it records | When it fires |
|---|---|---|---|
| Leaf 1: Authorization | AGTS_GOVERNANCE_ENVELOPE_V1 | Action was permitted under these conditions | After validator quorum + sovereign authority signing |
| Leaf 2: Execution | AGTS_EXECUTION_TRACE_V1 | This is what actually happened | After the authorized action executes |
| Leaf 3: Variance | AGTS_VARIANCE_RECORD_V1 | This is the measured gap between intent and reality | After execution trace is admitted |
The three leaves form a cryptographic chain: Leaf 2 references Leaf 1 by parent_auth_leaf_hash. Leaf 3 references both by parent_auth_leaf_hash and parent_exec_leaf_hash. An auditor can reconstruct the complete chain using only the transparency log and standard SHA-256 operations.
§2 Why the Base Protocol Is Incomplete
The base AGTS protocol satisfies the RTR "Decision Firewall" (Stage 5): collapse gating ensures that only states satisfying H ≤ H_max ∩ C ≥ C_min can produce a commitment. This is necessary but not sufficient.
The gap: After the gate passes and the action is authorized, the base protocol has no mechanism to verify that the physical execution matched the authorized intent.
| Scenario | Authorization leaf says | What actually happens | Detection without closed loop |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nominal | Permitted: deploy model v2.1 | Model v2.1 deployed, metrics stable | ✓ |
| Silent drift | Permitted: maintain temperature 2–8°C | Temperature drifted to 9°C for 3 minutes | ✗ |
| Governance gap | Permitted: trade within VaR limits | Trading algorithm exceeded VaR during execution | ✗ |
§3 Execution Witness (L6 — Stage 6)
§3.1 Artifact: AGTS_EXECUTION_TRACE_V1
§3.2 Who produces the execution trace
The execution trace is produced by the same clearinghouse node that produced the authorization. The node_id in the trace matches the node_id of the authorization proof bundle — non-repudiation by construction.
§3.3 Domain metrics commitment
The execution_metrics_hash commits to domain-specific data without storing it in the log:
| Domain | Example execution metrics | Hash input |
|---|---|---|
| Supply chain | { temperature_max: 7.2, handling_events: 3 } | SHA256(canonical_json(metrics)) |
| Financial | { realized_pnl: 42300, var_utilization: 0.78 } | SHA256(canonical_json(metrics)) |
| Cybersecurity | { action: "block_ip", endpoints_affected: 3 } | SHA256(canonical_json(metrics)) |
§3.4 Outcome pre-classification
| Classification | L2 distance | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| NOMINAL | ≤ 0.05 | Execution matched authorized intent |
| DEVIATED | ≤ 0.20 | Measurable drift, within operational tolerance |
| BREACHED | > 0.20 | Execution exceeded authorized bounds |
§4 Variance Reconciliation Engine (L7 — Stage 7)
§4.1 Artifact: AGTS_VARIANCE_RECORD_V1
§4.2 Omega breach detection
This is the most critical scenario: the five-gate validation correctly permitted the action, but the execution drove the state outside the admissible region. Without the closed loop, this breach is invisible.
§5 Cross-Leaf Linkage — Log Worker Enforcement
Rule 1: Execution traces MUST have a valid parent authorization. If parent_auth_leaf_hash does not correspond to an existing leaf, the trace MUST be rejected with HTTP 422 and error code PARENT_AUTH_NOT_FOUND.
Rule 2: Variance records MUST have valid parent authorization AND execution. Both parent_auth_leaf_hash and parent_exec_leaf_hash must correspond to existing leaves.
Rule 3: No orphaned execution traces. An execution trace referencing a non-existent authorization MUST be rejected.
§6 HCE Feedback Loop
| Measurement type | Trigger | H nudge | C nudge | E nudge |
|---|---|---|---|---|
execution_nominal | NOMINAL variance | +0.015 | +0.015 | −0.010 |
execution_drift | DRIFT variance | −0.025 | −0.020 | +0.025 |
execution_breach | BREACH variance | −0.070 | −0.050 | +0.070 |
The feedback is one-directional and forward-only: variance from cycle N affects observables for cycle N+1. The append-only log guarantees no retroactive modification.
§7 Audit Path
An auditor investigating a specific action retrieves three leaves: Authorization (replay the five-gate evidence, validator votes, authority signature), Execution trace (actual execution state, domain metrics hash, outcome classification), and Variance record (computed gap, per-observable deltas, omega breach status).
All three are linked by parent_auth_leaf_hash and parent_exec_leaf_hash. The chain is self-contained — no external data required for the basic audit.
§8 What This Does Not Change
The closed-loop extension does not modify: the five-gate validation predicate, the proof bundle format, the governance envelope format, the validator network, the sovereign authority signing ceremony, the existing canonical leaf format, or the STH, witness, and consistency proof protocols.
It adds two new leaf types to the same log, using the same Merkle tree, the same signing primitives, and the same verification infrastructure. The base protocol is a strict subset of the closed-loop protocol.