Protocol Diagrams

AGTS architecture in diagrams.

Seven architecture diagrams: governance mesh, leaf structure, Merkle tree, quorum flow, closed-loop triple-leaf, and the full clearinghouse pipeline.

Informative

Governance Flow (complete)

Machine Execution Layer Your AI system proposes an action. Any model · any infrastructure · ObligationSign does not access or modify your system governance evidence G1 · G2 · G3 · G4 · G5 + evidence hashes (4×) Clearinghouse 1. Accumulate measurement chain · Merkle-chained HCE observables 2. Assemble AGTS_PROOF_BUNDLE_V1 · gate_results (G1–G5) · evidence hashes (4×) · parent_bundle_hash · state_before_hash · state_after_hash · replay_seed 3. Sign: SHA256(canonical_json(bundle_body)) → node_signature Verdict: COMMIT → continue · QUARANTINE → hold · REFUSE → block Gate failure → action blocked before execution · zero-latency enforcement AGTS_PROOF_BUNDLE_V1 (signed) signed by clearinghouse node key Validator Network · BFT · 3-of-4 Quorum Validator A: ACCEPT / REJECT → AGTS_VOTE_V1 (signed ECDSA P-256) Validator B: ACCEPT / REJECT → AGTS_VOTE_V1 (signed ECDSA P-256) Validator C: ACCEPT / REJECT → AGTS_VOTE_V1 (signed ECDSA P-256) Validator D: ACCEPT / REJECT → AGTS_VOTE_V1 (signed ECDSA P-256) → Quorum Certificate: ≥3 ACCEPT votes · Byzantine fault-tolerant · no single point of control quorum_certificate ≥3 validator signatures · threshold verified Sovereign Authority GrapheneOS Pixel · Titan M2 secure enclave · StrongBox HSM · setIsStrongBoxBacked(true) Biometric gate → authority_signature over envelope body hash Produces: AGTS_GOVERNANCE_ENVELOPE_V1 · No remote key · Hardware-bound signing AGTS_GOVERNANCE_ENVELOPE_V1 authority_signature + quorum_certificate Transparency Log · Append-only Merkle Tree leaf_hash = SHA256("AGTS_LEAF_V1" ‖ canonical_json(envelope)) Admitted to Merkle tree at leaf_index N STH updated: tree_size = N+1 · root_hash = new_root log_signature covers { log_id, tree_size, root_hash, timestamp } · Signed Tree Head Public: GET /agts/v1/log/sth · GET /agts/v1/log/proof?leaf_hash=H · GET /agts/v1/log/leaf?index=N Witnesses Countersign STH · Ed25519 witness signature Gossip with peer witnesses Equivocation detection · consistency verification Monitors Scan for BREACH conditions Verify log consistency · alert on omega_breach Regulator · Insurer · Counterparty · Independent

Proof Bundle Chain

Each proof bundle references its predecessor by parent_bundle_hash, creating a hash chain that makes history deletion detectable.

Genesis Bundle parent_bundle_hash: "0000000000000000...0000" bundle_hash: SHA256(canonical_json(body)) parent_bundle_hash = genesis_bundle_hash Bundle N parent_bundle_hash: genesis_bundle_hash bundle_hash: SHA256(canonical_json(body_N)) parent_bundle_hash = bundle_N_hash Bundle N+1 parent_bundle_hash: bundle_N_hash · chain continues … Chain break: if any bundle altered, parent_bundle_hash in N+1 no longer resolves → tampering detectable

Triple-Leaf Ledger (Closed Loop)

Leaf 1 · Authorization · AGTS_GOVERNANCE_ENVELOPE_V1 subject_id: "supply-chain:batch-4401" auth_state: { H: 0.90, C: 0.85, E: 0.10 } quorum: 3-of-4 validators · authority_signature: present leaf_hash: "a1b2c3d4e5f6..." parent_auth_leaf_hash = "a1b2c3d4e5f6..." log enforces: no execution leaf without valid parent Leaf 2 · Execution · AGTS_EXECUTION_TRACE_V1 subject_id: "supply-chain:batch-4401" exec_state: { H: 0.88, C: 0.83, E: 0.12 } execution_metrics_hash: SHA256(canonical_json(actual_metrics)) · outcome: "NOMINAL" leaf_hash: "d4e5f6g7h8i9..." parent_auth_leaf_hash = "a1b2c3..." · parent_exec_leaf_hash = "d4e5f6..." log enforces: no variance record without both parent leaves Leaf 3 · Variance · AGTS_VARIANCE_RECORD_V1 delta: { H: -0.02, C: -0.02, E: +0.02 } · l2_distance: 0.0346 classification: "NOMINAL" · omega_breach: false drift_direction: { H: -1, C: -1, E: +1 } leaf_hash: "g7h8i9j0k1l2..." HCE feedback nudge: +0.015 H · +0.015 C · -0.010 E → next authorization cycle (closed loop)

Merkle Tree Structure (4-leaf example)

root_hash R H(A, B) H(C, D) sibling ③ leaf_A ① start leaf_B sibling ② leaf_C leaf_D Inclusion proof for leaf_A: ① leaf_hash_A (start) ② sibling: leaf_hash_B (right) → h = SHA256(leaf_hash_A ‖ leaf_hash_B) = H(A,B) ③ sibling: H(C,D) (right) → h = SHA256(H(A,B) ‖ H(C,D)) = root_hash R Verify: assert computed_root == sth.root_hash → leaf_A is included ✓

Governance Mesh (L4)

Institution A Clearinghouse · Operators submit leaves Institution B Clearinghouse · Operators submit leaves Institution C Clearinghouse · Operators submit leaves Shared / Dedicated Transparency Logs (L3: shared · L4: mesh) Append-only Merkle tree · Signed Tree Head (STH) · All institutions' envelopes STH STH STH Witness A Countersign STH · gossip Equivocation detection Witness B Countersign STH · gossip Equivocation detection Witness C Countersign STH · gossip Equivocation detection consistent STH stream Monitors Monitor (Regulator) · Monitor (Insurer) Monitor (Counterparty) · Independent auditors Needs only: log_id · No access to operator systems required
Full specification → Architecture overview → Closed-loop spec →